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Mark Hoffman
School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology

Abstract. The increased reliance on demand-side management policies as an urban water
consumption management tool has stimulated considerable debate among economists, water utility
managers, regulators, consumer interest groups and policymakers. In turn, this has fostered an
increasing volume of literature aimed at providing best-practice estimates of price and income
elasticities, quantifying the impact of non-price water restrictions and gauging the impact of
nondiscretionary environmental factors affecting residential water demand. This paper provides a
synoptic survey of empirical residential water demand analyses conducted in the last twenty-five
years. Both model specification and estimation and the outcomes of the analyses are discussed.
Keywords. Water demand; Demand side management; Price and income elasticity

1. Introduction
Water supply efficiency and demand management are increasingly important issues for
residential water supply authorities throughout the world. Population growth, coupled with
the reduction in freshwater supplies and the increasing cost of infrastructure, has prompted
suppliers to place renewed emphasis on demand management through pricing structures and
other strategies to control consumption. At the same time, the impact of global warming with
potentially higher demands and lower supplies, and the higher values placed by the citizenry
on environmental protection and sustainability have also had a role to play. Clearly, there is
the need for better demand forecasting: given the real cost and value of water is now
significantly higher, so too is the possible loss from under- or over-prediction of demand.
Concurrently, there is ongoing debate about the competing demands of consumers and
other stakeholders. Klawitter (2003), for example, argues that sustainable urban water pricing
must be designed to meet, amongst others, the needs of current and future generations,
resource use efficiency, full cost recovery (including supply costs, opportunity costs and
economic externalities), economic viability of the water utility, and equity and fairness for
different users. Dalhuisen et al. (2001) agree that the pricing structure should cover costs, be
fair, induce economically efficient usage (i.e. meet the long run marginal social cost), and be
administratively feasible. One important outcome of this debate has been a reorientation of
public policy in that agricultural, industrial and commercial water use is not the only focus of
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attention. With households accounting for a substantial proportion of total water supply use in
most developed economies, residential water demand has become a principal concern of
policymakers.
In response, an extensive body of literature around the world has concerned itself with the
estimation of residential water demand functions. In a multiplicity of contexts, these studies
have analyzed a range of market and non-market systems with different tariff structures with
an assortment of samples. Nevertheless, they share a common focus; namely, providing bestpractice estimates of price and income elasticities for designing better charging regimes,
quantifying the impact of non-price water restrictions to judge their effectiveness in
controlling demand, and gauging the impact of environmental factors to identify the sources
and magnitudes of discretionary and non-discretionary water usage. They also have a focus
on average rather than peak demand, so the literature is necessarily concerned with using
prices to manage overall demand, rather than the different peak demands that arise on an
hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or other seasonal basis. The resultant elasticity estimates must,
of course, be viewed from this perspective.
The findings from such research are not uncontentious. While economists generally agree
that urban water prices that reflect marginal costs is a means of reducing demand during
periods of limited water supply availability, others argue that urban water demand is
relatively price inelastic, and therefore price is an ineffective tool for regulating demand and
consumption. Supporters of this viewpoint suggest that more appropriate mechanisms for
regulating water consumption are non-price strategies, encompassing public education
campaigns, rationing, water use restrictions and subsidisation of programs aimed at adopting
more water efficient technologies. Proponents of the alternative argue that non-price controls,
especially water restrictions, decrease consumer welfare, increase deadweight losses, are
inequitable and unpopular and place an unnecessary administrative burden on struggling
public and private sector water utilities.
2. Scope and Contribution of Survey
At least one study, Arbues et al. (2003), has surveyed the estimation of residential water
demand. However, few papers included in that survey were published after the late 1990s,
and there is an emphasis placed on the earliest modeling approaches. Other possibilities
include the meta-analyses by Espey et al. (1997) and Dalhuisen et al (2003). While these
suffer from the usual limitations of meta-analysis – they cannot improve the quality or
reporting of the original work, diversity is often ignored or mishandled, and the variability of
the sample, the quality of the data, and the potential for underlying biases are not addressed –
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they also necessarily focus on providing indicative measures of price and income elasticity,
and are not particularly useful for researchers undertaking new work. Apart from discussing
the strengths and weaknesses of the different empirical methods, this article examines the
steps faced by researchers as they move from a selected approach, to model specification, to
the interpretation of results. All of this information is summarized and tabulated on a studyby-study basis. This highlights the empirical problems that have received attention in the
literature, and the efforts by researchers to overcome these problems. It therefore provides
guidance to those conducting empirical research in residential water demand and is also an
aid for policymakers, consumer interest and environmental groups, regulators, water utility
managers and industry practitioners interpreting the outcomes of these studies.
This review concentrates on studies published since 1980. EconLit, the Journal of
Economic Literature electronic database, was searched to identify articles concerned with
residential water demand estimation. References from these studies were used to identify
other articles not included in the database. Because of this selection process, most of the
studies are journal articles, with relatively fewer discussion, conference and project papers.
Of the thirty-seven studies presented in Table 1 (recent examples in brackets), fifty-six
percent are based on samples in the United States (Renwick and Green 2000; Gaudin et al.
2001; Timmins 2002); twenty-four percent are in Europe (Nauges and Thomas 2000;
Martinez-Espineira 2002; Nauges and Thomas 2003), sixteen percent are in Australia (Higgs
and Worthington 2001; Hoffman et al. 2006) and the remainder in other settings. Most
employ least squares regression techniques in some way, with the remainder using other
techniques, including logit, generalized methods of moments, instrumental variables and
cointegration.
However, despite their dissimilar contexts and techniques these studies mostly share a
common step-by-step empirical procedure that first determines the choice of estimation
method, and second the specification of dependent and independent variables to be used in
the selected approach. This usually takes the form: QD = f(P, Z) where QD is the quantity of
residential water demanded (more likely consumed), P is some measure of water price, and Z
represents other independent variables thought to impact upon residential water demand.
These usually include income, household structure and size, property characteristics, nonprice water restrictions and so on (Arbues et al. 2003).
This specification is entirely generalisable in that cross-sectional, time-series or pooled
cross-sectional and time-series (panel) data can be employed. It can also include data from
either a sample of individual households, the whole of the residential sector where
consumption from the population of households is summed, and in some cases, whole-of-
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utility consumption which may include some influence (and possible bias) from the presence
of non-residential water consumption (i.e. agricultural, commercial and industrial). The
estimated parameters of this model are the key to identifying several important economic
relationships likely to assist demand side management policies for urban water consumption.
First, the provision of price and income elasticities of demand to evaluate the impact on
quantity demanded to changes in price and income. Second, the impact of non-price factors
on both discretionary and non-discretionary urban water consumption can be ascertained.
Finally, the level of interaction between these factors of demand can also be revealed.
3. Tariff Metering, Structure and Billing
A key feature of demand side management policies is the pricing structure used to apply to
water services. Study of the effects of pricing structure can explain how effective price has
been in regulating water consumption and thereby how successful price has been in meeting
the multiple objectives usually taken into account when designing an optimal pricing policy.
For the most part, the empirical researcher is likely to find that a particular tariff structure is
already in place, perhaps for some time. And since the observations used for deriving demand
are drawn from this context, a good knowledge of the existing tariff structure is essential for
the purposes of model specification. Invariably, pricing structures are complex, meeting or
attempting to meet, the varying and often competing objectives of equity, financial stability,
simplicity, public acceptability and transparency, efficiency, the sustainability of service
provision and profitability. For the purposes of demand estimation, three salient features need
to be established: (i) the presence of individual household metering; (ii) the structure of prices
representing the split between fixed and variable prices and any variance in these prices; and
(iii) billing frequency indicating how often bills are issued to paying households for their
water consumption.
A variety of alternative charging methods has been employed in the past in an attempt to
meet these criteria (Dinar and Subramanian, 1998; Bartoszczuk and Nakamori, 2004). These
include a fixed charge invariant to the level of consumption; a fixed charge with a free
allowance followed by some excess charge for consumption over a particular level; and, as is
common in Australia and elsewhere, a two-part tariff consisting of a fixed component (an
access charge) and a usage component based on the actual amount of water consumed (a
volumetric charge). The latter can be non-linear if the cost per additional unit varies when
consumption reaches certain thresholds. In this way, the tariff consists of a sequence of
different marginal prices for different consumption blocks. These prices per kilolitre (or
gallon) of water consumed can be constant (a fixed block), increasing with each successive

RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMAND MODELLING

5

block of water use (an increasing block), or decreasing with each successive block of water
use (a decreasing block). By far the most complex block style tariff structure reported is by
Arbues et al (2001), who sheds light on charging practice in Zaragoza, Spain. Under the local
water supply mechanism, there are 140 progressive pricing blocks, with the total bill charged
at the highest block price for the period.
Because of the overwhelming dominance of US studies of residential water demand, tariff
structures including increasing and decreasing blocks have been well investigated. For
example, Billings and Agthe (1980), Agthe et al. (1986), Agthe and Billings (1987), Renwick
and Archibald (1998), Gaudin et al. (2001) have conducted analyses of increasing block
structures, Chicoine et al. (1986) and Williams and Suh (1986) have examined decreasing
blocks, while Foster and Beattie (1981), Schefter and David (1985), Nieswiadomy and
Molina (1989) and Timmins (2002) have included both increasing and decreasing block
regimes. But outside of the US there is generally less variation in side-by-side tariff
structures. For example, increasing block rates dominate studies in Spain [see MartinezEspineira (2003a; 2003b) and Martinez-Espineira and Nauges (2004)], Indonesia (Rietveld et
al. (2000) and Cyprus (Hajispyrou et al. 2002), while flat rate structures are the primary form
in France (Nauges and Thomas 2003) and Australia [see Thomas and Symer (1988),
Barkatulla (1996), Dandy et al. (1997), Higgs and Worthington (2001) and Hoffman et al.
(2006)]. This reflects, of course, the permissible and established tariff structures in these
economies, rather than any real preference by water researchers.
In general, most of the literature on water management advocates the introduction of
household metering (Yepes and Dianderas 1996; Dalhuisen et al. 2001; Bartoszczuk and
Nakamori 2004; Dalhuisen and Nijkamp 2001). In fact, it has been suggested that the mere
introduction of metering, regardless of the pricing structure used, results in a reduction in
water use. For example, Yepes and Dianderas (1996) argue that the use of household
metering can benefit system maintenance efforts. They found that unaccounted water
represents around 10 to 15 percent of the water supply in high income countries, rising to
over 50 percent in lower-income countries.
Nevertheless, with metering the incentive to charge large volume users higher prices
cannot be ignored. This is the most-common basis for increasing block tariffs, though the
incentive differs between large industrial/commercial and household users and the large and
small households as found in residential studies. Whittington (1992) argues that increasing
block rate tariffs are welfare reducing in developing countries. Two reasons are given: first,
many high density apartments have only one meter, so the more families per apartment, the
greater the chance of the total metered amount reaching the highest block prices. Second, in
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some areas of Ghana, unmetered households purchase water from neighbours or street
vendors, with the same block rate effect. Obviously, there is little incentive for the water
authority to invest in additional metering. Similarly, Dalhuisen and Nijkamp (2001) found
that in developing countries household water supply is often not installed due to its high cost,
so people buy their water from more expensive street vendors. It should also be said that
metering in developed economies is by no means universal (including Norway, Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Canada). In Australia, for example, many local councils and water
supply authorities still continue to explore the costs and benefits of installing individual
household metering, especially in apartment blocks.
The remaining feature relates to the billing cycle. Obviously, for any given household and
level of water consumption, billing frequency is inversely related to cost per assessment.
While the total water charge per year is unaffected, the difference lies in smaller, more
frequent charges as against larger, lower frequency charges. The theoretical argument is that
households are more aware of the impact on income of large bills and these can potentially
reduce water consumption in subsequent periods. Frequent billing also reminds consumers
more frequently of the fact that water costs. On the other hand, less frequent billing does not
afford the opportunity for households to quickly adjust consumption in light of these larger
bills. In general, billing frequency is little examined because of the low level of crosssectional and time-series variation. For example, most local government councils in Australia
use a 90-day billing cycle corresponding to the quarterly rates assessment and this has
changed little in recent years. Stevens et al. (1992) is one of the few studies to expressly
model billing frequency, but found it to be statistically insignificant influence on water
consumption. Griffin and Chang (1990) found a similar result when they attempted to account
for rate changes in their model. Realistically, of course, the meaningful analysis of billing
frequency can only be made in cross-sectional studies covering a range of utilities, and the
overwhelming emphasis of past work on time-series in a single utility indicates why so little
is known about this particular impact.
4. Determinants of Demand
4.1 Pricing
By the law of demand, residential water consumption should be inversely related to water
price; as a commodity with few substitutes, the price elasticity of demand should also be
inelastic. And where there is a single volumetric price (say, dollars per kilolitre), water
demand estimation is relatively straightforward. Problematically, discontinuous tariff
structures [that is, those that include a fixed access charge, with or without a ‘free’ water
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allowance, and/or a decreasing or increasing volumetric rate] do not lend themselves to
classic econometric modelling techniques.
Consider, for example, a decreasing block rate structure where the price per unit of water
falls as consumption increases: it is immaterial whether the price charged is ‘stepped’, with
only a small number of decrements, or declines continuously (though the latter is clearly more
complex). Since the marginal price varies according to consumption, this structure may
introduce multiple price-quantity sets for a consumer tangent to their highest indifference
curve, due to the budget line being convex to the origin. Because of this, estimates of price
elasticity will vary (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995). This applies not only to the case of
multiple tariffs, but also those pricing schedules where a free allowance is involved. The latter
effectively involves a zero price for the first block in an increasing block system. Stevens et
al. (1992) chose to discard observations in zero price regions, while Dandy et al. (1997) used
dummy variables to identify the presence of free water allowances. Where no free allowance
is involved, empirical evidence indicates water consumption is positively related to the access
charge, though its magnitude is very small [see, for instance, Hoglund (1999)]. The logical
suggestion is higher water consumption is associated with higher costs of production and, in
turn, higher access charges.
To overcome the problem more generally, it was proposed that an additional price variable
reflecting the income effect imposed by decreasing or increasing rate block structures be
included in water demand estimations. The concept of including a second price along with the
marginal price was first introduced by Taylor (1975) (though in the context of electricity
pricing). Taylor (1975) suggested that a single price variable, either the average or marginal
price, was not sufficient. This approach was further developed by Nordin (1976) who
introduced a difference variable referred to as the ‘rate structure premium’ defined as the
difference between the total bill less what the bill would have been if the water quantity was
consumed at the marginal price. The hypothesis is the rate structure premium should be able
to capture the income effects of changes in the intramarginal prices, the fixed price and the
quantity breakpoints. Nordin’s (1976) premise was that consumers react not only to marginal
prices, but also to the changes in consumer surplus as a result of moving from one block to
the other, and that these intramarginal effects should be included in the demand equation. The
difference variable in terms of consumer surplus is described as the difference in the
consumer surplus under marginal pricing, and the consumer surplus that is actually
experienced by a typical consumer. In case of increasing (decreasing) block tariffs the
consumer surplus is larger (smaller) then if the units were purchased at the marginal price.

8
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A large number of studies have specified Nordin’s difference variable as a measure of
price, including Chicoine et al. (1986), Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Hewitt and
Hanemann (1995), Barkatullah (1996), Renwick and Archibald (1998) and Martinez-Espinera
(2003b). Chicoine et al. (1986), for example, concluded that the Nordin specification was
largely unnecessary, recommending simple ordinary least squares (OLS) with marginal
prices, even for block rate structures. Barkatullah (1996) disagreed, finding that OLS and
instrumental variable (IV) models under multi-block tariffs are supportive of the Nordin
theory. Arbués et al (2003), however, found that while the range of elasticity values can vary
according to how price is specified, in many cases the difference was not noticeable. Stevens
et al. (1992) also compared the price elasticity between increasing, flat and decreasing block
tariff systems and concluded that calculated elasticities were not statistically different across
the various price specifications. Finally, Espey’s et al. (1997) meta-analysis concluded that
studies using Nordin’s difference variable yielded significantly higher estimates of elasticity
than those specifying the marginal price alone.
Nordin’s specification remains the subject of much controversy. This is because it is
argued that while a perfectly-informed consumer should react to marginal price and the rate
premium (as defined Nordin-style) most consumers do not devote the time or effort to study
the structure or the change in intramarginal rates due to information costs (Nieswiadomy and
Molina, 1991). Because of this, the Nordin specification (marginal price and difference) is
argued to be significant in neither a statistical nor economic sense, though
The essence of this argument is derived from Shin (1985). Shin (1985) suggested that the
cause might be price illusion or incomplete information concerning the full budget constraint.
Shin (1985) hypothesised that the coefficients of the rate structure premium and income
variables should be equal in magnitude but opposite in sign because each measures a pure
income effect: their coefficients in a linear demand equation should be equal. Certainly, the
expected sign of income is positive, but the derivative of water use with respect to the
difference is negative because increasing the intramarginal rates increases the difference and
the implicit tax which reduces water use. To capture the pure income effect, Shin (1985)
introduced yet another variable, the price perception variable, in addition to the marginal
price. Shin’s (1985) price perception model showed that consumers respond to average prices
rather than marginal prices when faced with decreasing block rate structures. In early work,
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) used a price perception model to compare increasing and
decreasing block tariffs and found that customers react to marginal prices when facing
increasing block rates and average prices when faced with decreasing block rates.
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Across the remaining literature, there is a wide variation in price specification. Williams
and Suh (1986), Moncur (1987), Nieswiadomy (1992) and Garcia and Reynaud (2003)
specify marginal prices while Agthe and Billings (1980), Foster and Beattie (1981), Chicoine
et al. (1986), Barkatullah (1996), Renwick et al. (1998) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003b)
adjust the marginal price with Nordin’s difference. Carver and Boland (1980) specify the real
price (adjusted for changes in the general price level; Gaudin et al. (2001) uses the average
price, while Chicoine et al. (1986) and Griffin and Chang (1990) subtract the marginal price
from the average price. Finally, Hajispyrou et al. (2002) employ the marginal price in the
highest tariff block, while Schefter and David (1985) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003a) use an
average marginal price.
Certainly, the lack of variation in price elasticity estimates belies the substantial variation
in price specification. Almost without exception, the estimated price elasticities are negative
and inelastic (less than one), signifying the percentage reduction in the quantity of residential
water demanded is less than proportionate to the percentage increase in price. While some
estimates are very low – see Carver and Boland (1980), Thomas and Syme (1988),
Barkatullah (1996), Renwick et al. (1998) and Martinez-Espinera and Nauges (2004) for price
elasticities less than 0.25 – many more lie in the range of 0.25 to 0.75 – see Agthe and
Billings (1980), Chicoine et al. (1986), Williams and Suh (1986), Nieswiadomy and Molina
(1989), Nieswiadomy (1992), Pint (1999), Gaudin et al. (2001), Martinez-Espineira (2003a).
Reasons for the empirical variation in price elasticity estimates remain elusive. Espey’s et
al (1997) rather-dated meta-analysis at least removes some possible contenders: there is no
significant difference between estimates from linear and log-linear models or least squares
and other estimation techniques; and it appears to matter little if the sample uses household or
aggregate (i.e. aggregated households, not aggregated industrial, commercial, agricultural and
household users) data or specifies cross-sectional or time-series daily, monthly, quarterly or
annual consumption. More likely prospects concern the failure of many studies to take into
account market timing. For example, long-run price elasticity estimates are invariably more
elastic than short run estimates [Agthe and Billings 1980; Carver and Boland 1980; Agthe et
al 1986; Moncur 1987; Dandy et al. 1997; Martinez-Espinera 2003b; Nauges and Thomas
(2003)] and winter price elasticity is less elastic then summer price elasticity (Dandy et al.
1997; Pint 1999; Gaudin et al. 2001). As justification, Arbués et al. (2003) suggest that longrun price responsiveness is likely to be greater due to the capital investment required by
consumers to purchase water efficient appliances such as toilets, taps, showers and washing
machines. Likewise, an estimate of price elasticity at the means can vary where there is
income heterogeneity. For instance, Agthe and Billings (1987), Thomas and Syme (1988),

WORTHINGTON AND HOFFMANN

10

Renwick and Archibald (1998) have concluded that the price elasticity of residential water
demand is lower for low income households than middle and high income households. The
other possibility is that because non-discretionary (or necessity) demands have a lower price
elasticity than discretionary (or luxury) demands, the lower proportion of discretionary
demands in low-income households infers lower price elasticities.
4.2. Income
For normal goods, demand should increase proportionately with income. With water, the
measurement of income effects on consumption is important, because water bills often
represent a lower proportion of income for higher-income households (Arbués et al. 2003). In
studies based on whole-of-utility data, income is normally per capita or per household,
whereas in household-based studies actual household income (or a proxy such as housing
value) can be employed. A further consideration is that income, through its correlation with
education, may be reflective of water conservation measures taken by the household itself
through the purchase of water-conserving appliances and planting of drought-tolerant garden
vegetation. In addition, since income can approximate wealth, income (from taxation, census
and survey data) can also be used to proxy other normal and luxury goods associated with
household water consumption where data may not be as easily obtainable, including
swimming pools and spas, in-ground garden irrigation systems, and dishwashing machines.
Estimates of income elasticity in the literature are almost universally income inelastic (less
than one) and small in magnitude [see, for instance, Chicoine et al. (1986), Moncur (1987),
Thomas and Symer (1988), Barkatullah (1996), Dandy et al. (1997), Gaudin et al. (2001),
Garcia and Reynaud (2003). This appears consistent with the strong likelihood that the
income elasticity of residential water demand is indeed low. But there is also the possibility
that sample or specification bias may have a role to play. For example, few studies sample
very income-diverse populations: the income elasticity of water demand would be higher with
more variation in household income, say, between households in developing and developed
economies. In addition, there is the aforementioned complication that increasing and
decreasing block rates potentially encompass income effects. This may also serve to reduce
the significance and magnitude of income effects. A final consideration is that the estimated
income elasticities are short-run. Income-related activities like buying new appliances,
moving house and house extensions, for example, that affect water demand, may only be
possible

over the longer term, so a more complex model allowing for this longer-run

transition may be appropriate.
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4.3. Weather and seasonal factors
Household water demand comprises two main components: discretionary and nondiscretionary demand. Discretionary water use is normally defined as that used for watering
lawns and gardens, swimming pools, washing cars and other forms of outdoor cleaning, but
can also include inside use like power showers (where a pump is used to boost the flow rate),
spas and other luxury uses. Non-discretionary water use then refers to water used for basic
needs such as drinking, cooking and personal hygiene, including laundering, bathing and
toilet flushing. For this reason, discretionary water use is regarded as being more price
responsive than non-discretionary water use, and as it is largely employed outside, more
influenced by weather and other seasonal factors.
As a rule, residential water use is usually shown to be highly sensitive to seasonal
fluctuations. For example, Maidment and Miaou (1986) examined daily water use in nine US
cities using a physics-type transfer function excluding price and income effects. They found
that the response to rainfall depended first on its occurrence, and then on its magnitude, and
that there is a non-linear response of water use to temperature changes: with no response for
daily maximum air temperatures between 4-21oC and an increase in water use with
temperatures above 21oC. Further, water demand was hardly affected as consumption
approached a subsistence level.
Weather and other seasonal factors have been specified in a number of ways. These range
from temperature (Griffin and Chang 1990), minutes of sunshine, precipitation, rainfall,
temperature and rainfall (Stevens et al. (1992), the number of rainy days (Hoffman et al.
(2006), and even the evapo-transpiration rate of Bermuda grass less rainfall (Billings and
Agthe 1980, Agthe et al. 1986, Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989 and Hewitt and Hanemann
1995). If the data frequency is at least semi-annual, the possibility also exists for seasonal
variation, and dummy variables are generally used to control for summer and winter
consumption. Without exception, summer price elasticities are lower than winter price
elasticities, indicating that it is discretionary water that is most affected by behavioural
changes.
Nonetheless, there has been some criticism surrounding the specification of weather
parameters. Maidment and Miaou (1986) argue that the linear relationship assumed between
the proxy for weather, such as rainfall, and the focus of measurement often breaks down. For
example, the impact of rainfall diminishes over time and the effect is greater with higher
levels of water use prior to rain. Likewise, Martínez-Espiñeira (2002) suggests that the mere
occurrence of rain has a psychological impact, and so the number of rainy days rather than the
amount of rain has a greater impact on water demand. Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004)
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also found that water demand is minimally affected by weather as consumption approaches
some base (non-discretionary) level of use. Finally, in their meta-analysis, Espey et al (1997)
and Dalhuisen et al. (2003) argued that the incorporation of rainfall results in significantly
less elastic estimates of the price elasticity of demand. At first sight this would suggest some
rainfall and prices are positively related, lying at odds with the notion that prices should be set
with scarcity in mind.
4.4 Population and household composition
If the dependent variable is defined as water usage per household, household size should be
positively associated with water use. However, not all studies have included household size,
even when considering average household water consumption (Agthe and Billings 1980;
Nieswiadomy 1992). Accordingly, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on scale
economies in water consumption, though the evidence that does exist is very strong. Arbués
et al. (2000), for example, found that the increase in water use is often less than proportional
to the increase in household size or population. They postulated that an increase in the
number of households, with population held constant, would lead to an increase in the total
water demand in an area. In the same way, an increase in population in inner city and other
densely populated areas is unlikely to be associated with an increase in consumption due to
smaller housing lots, smaller gardens, and a higher predominance of flats and units. However,
in countries where garden-related use is not strong, the extra in-house use (washing, bathing,
etc.) would tend to dominate.
A further consideration is household composition. Nauges and Thomas (2000), for
example, argued that water consumption in areas with a higher proportion of younger persons
is likely to be higher due to more frequent laundering and use of water-intensive outdoor
leisure activities. However, communities with a higher proportion of older inhabitants may be
more focused on gardening. Martinez-Espineira (2003a), for instance, included variables
reflecting both the proportion of the population over 64 years and those under 19 years. In
addition, people from different cultural backgrounds may be more or less reactive to the price
of water. Griffin and Chang (1990) and Gaudin et al. (2001) specified the percentage of the
population of Spanish origin as a determinant in their study of water consumption in Texas.
4.5 Non-price consumption controls
In terms of demand-side management policies, a number of non-price controls on
consumption are possible. These can include prohibitions and restrictions on the watering of
gardens, filling of swimming pools, car washing and path and building cleaning. However,
they also include appeals for water conservation and education campaigns aimed at limiting
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water use. Because of the ubiquitous nature of these policies and their possible interaction
with other variables, especially pricing, there is the requirement to include some specification
in analyses of water demand and consumption (Syme et al. 2000). Renwick, et al. (1998), for
instance, argue that the clear definition of all relevant policy variables is important for
accurate measurement since the nature of the policies used may vary either through time or
cross-sectionally.
Syme et al. (2000) have argued that the possible interactions of non-price campaigns with
other policy instruments make it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. Statistical studies
using regression have problems with multicollinearity among the variables. Interpretation is
also a problem, possibly due to unmeasured exogenous variables; for example, a marketing
campaign may heighten the motivation to respond to the pricing schedule. Interestingly, while
feedback information on usage has been shown to reduce energy consumption, it appears to
make little difference to water consumption. Possible causes given are: ineffective
conservation methods, water saving is more difficult, water is too cheap to worry about and a
lack of motivation to save (Thomas and Syme, 1988).
5. Data and Sampling Frequency
The availability (or rather acute lack) of accurate data at an appropriate frequency has plagued
attempts at modelling residential water demand. In theory, estimating residential water
demand functions with household level data would be the most valuable, especially
consistently over time. But while many researchers advocate the use of household level
surveys to specifically identify and measure all relevant household characteristics, only a few
have actually been conducted, comprising Foster and Beattie (1981), Nieswiadomy (1992),
Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Higgs and Worthington (2001), Arbues et al. (2001), and
Hajispyrou et al. (2002). As an alternative, Rizaiza (1991) and Renwick and Archibald (1998)
used stratified random sampling of surveys.
The lack of data availability may help explain the high rate of data re-use from previously
published work. For example, the 1974-1980 data for Tucson, Arizona first used in Agthe and
Billings (1980) was later specified in Billings and Agthe (1980), Agthe et al. (1986) and
Agthe and Billings (1987), while a 1976-1985 Denton, Texas dataset was repeatedly
employed in Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989; 1991), Griffin and Chang (1990), Hewitt and
Hanemann (1995) and Gaudin et al. (2001). This is problematic in that much of an apparently
broad literature is, in reality, reliant on only a few unique datasets. That said, and as shown in
Table 1, the estimates are generally consistent, despite the dissimilar approaches, and this
yields some insight into the relatively (low) impact of specification change. At the same time,
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the cost of gathering information means that many other studies rely on rather-dated
information. For example, Carver and Boland (1980) specified a 1969-1974 Washington
panel, Foster and Beattie (1981) used a US cross-section from 1960, Moncur (1987)
examined a 1975-1981 Hawaiian panel, and Timmins (2002) used a 1970-1993 Californian
panel. Given the rapid change in charging regimes and conditions, these studies may not have
much to offer contemporary policymakers and utility managers.
Outside of the household-level surveys, most existing research has focused instead on
aggregated mains, community or utility-level data [see, for example, Thomas and Syme
(1988), Stevens et al. (1992), Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Barkatullah (1996), Timmins
(2002)]. However, this brings additional complications. One concerns the need for matching
average water consumption with the averages of other demand-related characteristics, often
from different sources with different frequencies. These potentially include household
income, household size, household demographics, etc. The more substantive complication is
the apparent inconsistency between non-price demand factors and the quantity demanded
being expressed in averages, while water prices are almost always in marginal terms. Schefter
and David (1985) argued that on this basis, the more accurate price measures are the mean
marginal price and the mean (Nordin) difference (emphasis added).
Pooled time-series, cross-sectional (or panel data) techniques have dominated the literature
[see, for instance, Agthe and Billings (1980), Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Hewitt and
Hanemann (1995), Dandy et al. (1997), Gaudin et al. (2001), Martinez-Espineira (2003a)].
But while the stability of estimates and the increasing degrees of freedom offered by panel
data are well known, most of these are unbalanced panels of aggregated communities and
utilities, with none following specific households over time. Cross-sectional techniques are
the next most popular [see Foster and Beattie (1981), Chicoine et al. (1986), Martin and
Thomas (1986), Stevens et al. (1992), Rietveld et al. (2000) and Hajispyrou et al. (2002).
And not surprisingly given the difficulty in gather accurate and consistent data, time series
techniques have not been well used. Further, there is little evidence of application of some of
the more advanced time-series techniques [for an exception see Martinez-Espinera (2003)].
The question also arises as to how these studies treat periods when demands exceed
supplies, such as droughts, and cannot be completely satisfied. For the most part, the literature
includes these periods and relies on factors such as rainfall and water restrictions to quantify
these impacts. The alternative, excluding periods when supplies actually meet demands, is not
found and the implication is that some misspecification in the estimation of the parameters
may result.
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6. Estimation Techniques
The existing literature on the estimation of the water demand models involves numerous
econometric techniques. For cross-sectional data, the empirical techniques employed include
ordinary least squares (OLS), generalised least squares (GLS), two and three-stage least
squares (2SLS and 3SLS), logit and instrumental variables (IV). In terms of time series data,
vector autoregressive (VAR) models and cointegration techniques could also be potentially
used, however the only known water demand study to do so is Martínez-Espiñeira (2003b).
Lastly, many techniques normally reserved for cross-sectiosn are equally applicable to pooled
time-series, cross-sectional (or panel) data, including OLS, GLS, maximum-likelihood (ML)
and 2SLS.
That said ordinary least squares methods dominate the water demand literature (Billings
and Agthe 1980; Chicoine et al 1986; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Higgs and Worthington
2001 and Martínez-Espiñeira 2003a). But one particular problem when using data with block
rate pricing is simultaneity: that is, when consumers select the quantity of water to be
demanded, they also select the price. Since the price of water both determines and is
determined by consumption, OLS estimation of block rate pricing models may yield biased
and inconsistent estimates. Since there is a need to find a proxy for the stochastic variable
price, several IV techniques have been suggested.
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) focus on two common approaches. The first introduces a
separate price equation in a two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. In the first stage, the
observed price is regressed against all explanatory variables during the increasing blockpricing period. The predicted price is then specified in the second stage as a regressor.
Nieswiadomy and Molina’s (1991) second approach involves the regression of the observed
water demand on the actual price that the household faces at different levels of water demand.
In the second stage, the predicted quantity demanded and the actual rate schedule is used to
obtain a predicted price (Agthe et al 1986; Agthe and Billings 1987; Barkatullah 1996; Hewitt
and Hanemann 1995 and Higgs and Worthington 2001). Regardless, both techniques are
likely to improve the reliability of estimates.
Within the many other techniques, a variety of functional forms have been employed,
some with allowance for non-linearity in the underlying consumption technologies. While
linear demand functions are easy to estimate, there is the implication that the change in
quantity demanded in response to a price change is the same at every price level. Another
form, the Cobb-Douglas function, is synonymous with the non-linear log-log (or double-log)
model. One of the well-known properties of Cobb-Douglas is that the estimated slope
coefficient represents the (partial) elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the
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independent variable, holding all other independent variables constant. This removes the
necessity of calculating partial elasticities at the means, as with linear functions. CobbDouglas water demand equations are widely used in the literature, including Foster and
Beattie (1981), Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Garcia and
Reynaud (2004). Alternatively, Gaudin et al. (2001) and Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges
(2004) have employed the alternative Stone-Geary utility function, which is also non-linear,
though log-lin. The main advantage of this form is that it can incorporate some minimum
amount of water demand, irrespective of prices. This subsistence level may be made
dependent on the evolution of consumer habits and stock of physical capital, in such a way
that its size varies with time.
7. Concluding Remarks
The primary focus of residential water demand modelling has been on obtaining consistent,
reliable and useful measures of the price (and to a lesser extent, income) elasticity of demand.
Price elasticity estimates are generally found in the range of zero to 0.5 in the short-run and
0.5 to unity in the long-run: income elasticity estimates are of a much smaller magnitude
(usually) and positive. The income elasticity of residential water may well be low; sample or
specification bias, however, may also be important. For instance, the income effects as
measured may be mixed up with price effects in poorly specified models or the elasticities are
really only valid in the short term, and may be substantially more elastic over the longer term.
Further, price elasticities are higher in the summer than the winter, and this is perhaps a
reflection of the differing impact of pricing on discretionary water use that is usually, but not
always, related to outside activities. The demand for water has also been shown to vary with
seasonal factors, household composition, and the imposition of water restrictions. Aggregate
and household level data have been shown to yield similar results and there appears to be no
statistically significant difference internationally in the price and income elasticities. These
are the least contentious aspects of this area of research.
A more contentious aspect concerns price specification, of which two dimensions have
been recognized. First, most water tariffs have complex structures that combine fixed and
variable charges. Because of this, there is a division placed between marginal and average
prices and consumers’ reaction to these prices will then depend on price perception. Second,
an additional complication arises where modelling techniques are required to compensate for
the (potential) income effect of variable block tariffs. Simultaneity is the basic issue, as
consumers choose quantity-price pairs: that is, decisions on quantity determine prices. But
specification is only part of the story. The most fundamental limitation in this area is the lack
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of data concerning households and their demands for water. Only with consistent and specific
information collected over relatively long periods of time in a variety of jurisdictions will it
be possible to definitively model the many influences on residential water consumption as an
input into residential water policy.
Certainly, there is an urgent, even dire, need for empirical work in this area. Consider
Australia where there is growing disquiet that the worst drought since 1788 and record high
temperatures are not part of some natural cycle, rather the longer realignment in rainfall and
temperature caused by global warming. With reservoirs in nearly all state capitals at critically
low levels, a lack of essential infrastructure, consideration of desalination plants and effluent
recycling plants, and the reallocation of water allocations from agriculture to urban use
already taking place, residential water demand management appears the only short-term
solution. Patently, good water demand modelling is the key to good water policymaking.
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TABLE 1. Empirical Analyses of Residential Water Demand
Author(s)

Data

Sample

Pricing
structure

Dependent
variable(s)

Independent variables

Estimation
technique(s)

Price
elasticity

Income
elasticity

Other findings

Agthe and
Billings
(1980)

Panel.

Tucson,
Arizona,
1974-1980.

Increasing
block and
flat rate

Monthly
household water
consumption.

Marginal price, difference price, evaporation
rate of Bermuda grass less rainfall, household
income.

OLS

Short-run
0.18-0.36;
long-run
0.27-0.50

Short-run
1.33-2.07;
long-run
1.97-2.77

Linear
model
elasticities
greater than log-log model.

Billings and
Agthe (1980)

Panel.

Tucson,
Arizona,
1974-1977.

Increasing
block rate.

Monthly
household water
consumption.

Marginal price (nominal and real), difference
term, implicit marginal sewer charge during
winter
months,
personal
income,
evapotranspiration less rainfall

OLS

0.27-0.49

n.a.

Real monetary values produce
substantially
stronger
statistical
results
than
unadjusted prices and incomes.

Carver and
Boland
(1980)

Panel.

Washington,
1969-1974.

Increasing
block rate.

Average annual
water
production
divided by the
number of
connections.

Real income, real price, average number of
residences per connection, average number of
employees
per
connection,
lagged
consumption.

OLS

Short-run
0.10; longrun 0.020.70

n.a.

When separated into seasonal
and non-seasonal components,
elasticities are substantially
more inelastic.

Foster and
Beattie
(1981)

Crosssectional

United States,
1960.

Increasing
and
decreasing
block rates

Average yearly
household water
consumption

Marginal price, difference price, median
household income, precipitation, average
number of residents per meter.

OLS

0.12

0.58

Results of a Nordin-type
marginal price model suggest
average price is a better
specification for yearly data.

Schefter and
David (1985)

Crosssectional

Wisconsin,
1997.

Increasing
and
decreasing
block rates

Quantity of
water delivered
to residential
users

Mean marginal price estimated using the
combined water and sewer tariffs, mean
difference using the combined water and
sewer tariffs, average household income;

OLS

n.a.

n.a.

Given aggregate data, mean
marginal price and mean price
difference are the most
appropriate.

Chicoine,
Deller and
Ramamurthy
(1986)

Crosssectional

Illinois,
1983.

Decreasing
block rate.

Monthly
household water
consumption.

Price index for other relevant goods, income,
Nordin’s difference (rate premium), marginal
price, average price less marginal price.

OLS, 2SLS
and 3SLS

0.22-0.42

0.01-0.14

3SLS estimates slightly more
efficient compared to 2SLS
estimates and consistent with
OLS.

Agthe,
Billings,
Dobra and
Rafiee (1986)

Panel.

Tucson,
Arizona,
1974-1980.

Increasing
block rate.

Monthly
household water
consumption.

Marginal price, rate structure premium,
evaporation rate of Bermuda grass less
rainfall, household income.

OLS, IV and
SE

Short-run
0.14; longrun 0.62

n.a.

Demand is significantly more
elastic in long run than in short
run.
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Estimation
technique(s)

Price
elasticity

Income
elasticity

Other findings

Martin and
Thomas
(1986)

Crosssectional

Kuwait, South
Australia,
Western
Australia,
Arizona,
1978/79 and
1981/82.

Various
volumetric
charging
systems.

Mean daily per
capita water
consumption.

Marginal price.

Geometric
analysis of
price and
quantity
pairs

0.50

n.a.

Precise estimates of demand
elasticities may not be
necessary for policy purposes.
Short-run elasticities give little
information
for
policy
purposes.

Williams and
Suh (1986)

Crosssectional.

United States,
1967.

Decreasing
block rate

Annual quantity
of water
demanded by
customer class

Marginal price, average revenue price, other
price measures, size of customer class, per
capita income, total rainfall recorded in the
summer months, average temperature in the
summer months, population per square mile.

OLS

0.25-0.48

0.640.77

Price elasticities larger for
average
revenue
price
specifications
than
for
marginal price specifications.

Chicoine and
Ramamurthy
(1986)

Panel.

Illinois,
1983.

Decreasing
block rate

Monthly water
consumption by
household

Average price decomposed into a marginal
price, monthly income less the effects of the
block rate structure (Nordin), number of
persons in household, number of bath rooms,
dummies for month.

OLS

n.a.

n.a.

The marginal price or average
price are, by themselves,
inadequate
in
explaining
consumption demand for rural
domestic water.

Moncur
(1987)

Panel.

Honolulu,
Hawaii,
1975-1981.

Decreasing
block and
flat rate

Total bimonthly
household water
consumption

Lagged consumption, marginal price, income
per household member, rainfall household
size, presence of water restrictions

OLS

Short-run
0.03-0.52;
long-run
0.10-0.68

0.04-0.08

A conservation program can
bolster price elasticity. During
a drought, price elasticity
decreases in magnitude.

Agthe and
Billings
(1987)

Panel.

Tucson,
Arizona,
1974-1980.

Increasing
block rate

Monthly
household water
consumption.

Marginal price, difference price, evaporation
rate of Bermuda grass less rainfall, household
income, presence of swimming pool, type of
yard vegetation, number of persons in
household.

2SLS and
IV

Low
income
0.56;
middle
0.49; upper
middle
0.46; high
0.40

n.a.

Substantial increase in water
use as household income rises.

Thomas and
Syme (1988)

Crosssectional.

Perth,
Western
Australia,
1982.

Flat rate.

Annual water
consumption
from public
mains supply.

Marginal price, difference variable, average
household income, annual precipitation,
restrictions on public water supply use, hours,
average household size, percentage of
households which use a private underground
water bore.

OLS

Overall
0.18;
low income
0.19;
middle
0.18; high
0.13

0.20-0.22

Contingent valuation approach
appears to be reliable and
applicable where the available
data do not favour regression
analysis.
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Author(s)

Data

Sample

Pricing
structure

Dependent
variable(s)

Independent variables

Estimation
technique(s)

Price
elasticity

Income
elasticity

Other findings

Nieswiadomy
and Molina
(1989)

Panel.

Denton,
Texas,
1976-1985.

Increasing
and
decreasing
block rates.

Monthly
household
consumption.

One-month lagged water consumption,
monthly income (based on house value),
marginal block price, ratio of lagged average
monthly price to current marginal price,
irrigable
land,
weather
(based
on
evapotranspiration of Bermuda grass less
precipitation).

OLS, IV and
2SLS

Stevens,
Miller and
Willis (1992)

Crosssectional.

Massachusetts,
1988.

Increasing,
decreasing
block and
flat rates.

Average water
consumption
per household

Average price of water plus sewerage,
average annual income per capita, population
density, average annual precipitation, average
annual temperature, billing frequency,
dummy variable for location of community,
dummies for pricing regime.

OLS and
2SLS

Nieswiadomy
(1992)

Crosssectional.

United States,
1984.

Increasing,
decreasing
block and
flat rates.

Average
monthly water
usage per
household

Minimum charge, average price, marginal
price, Shin’s price (perception price), income,
dummies for conservation and education
programs, regions, average monthly rainfall
and temperature.

OLS

n.a.

n.a.

Conservation does not appear
to
reduce
water
use.
Consumers react more to
average rather than marginal
prices in all regions.

Nieswiadomy
and Cobb
(1993)

Crosssectional

United States,
1984.

Increasing,
decreasing
block and
flat rates.

Water use per
household per
month

Marginal price, average price, public
education, number of persons per household,
percentage of home built before 1939,
percentage of homes that are owneroccupied, average rainfall per month and
average temperature between last spring
freeze and first fall freeze.

OLS and
Logit

Increasing
block 0.170.64;
decreasing
block 0.280.46

Increasing
block
0.57-0.63;
decreasing
block
0.22-0.45

Households react to average
prices under both decreasing
and
increasing
block
structures. Increasing block
structures
conservation
oriented.

Hewitt and
Hanemann
(1995)

Panel.

Denton, Texas
1981-1985.

Increasing
block rate.

Household
monthly water
consumption

Lawn size, weather, number of bathrooms,
house size, price, income (modified for
Nordin’s difference), number of days in
billing period.

OLS, IV
2SLS

1.57-1.63

0.15-0.16

Comparison of OLS, IV and
2SLS
regressions
using
summer component. Reason
for high values may be
summer only data.

Barkatullah
(1996)

Panel.

Sydney, New
South Wales,
1990-1994.

Increasing
block and
flat rates

Quarterly
household water
consumption.

Nordin-difference variable, marginal price,
average temperature, lagged rainfall, income,
property value, peak/off-peak dummy,
household size, number of bedrooms and
bathrooms, garden condition

OLS,
2SLSand
ML

0.21

0.07

OLS provides biased and
inefficient
estimates.
Consumers
respond
to
marginal prices when faced
with multi-part tariffs.

0.36-0.55

Flat rate 0.41;
increasing
block 0.54;
decreasing
block 0.69

0.14-0.15

Significant price effects with
decreasing and increasing
block rates.
Consumers react to average
price under decreasing block
and marginal price under
increasing block.

Flat rate
0.14;
increasing
block 0.17;
decreasing
block 0.28

Elasticities are not statistically
different between different
pricing structures.
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Dandy,
Nguyen and
Davies (1997)

Panel.

Adelaide,
South
Australia
1978- 1992.

Increasing
block and
flat rates.

Annual
household water
consumption

Quantity of water consumed in the previous
year, annual allowance, dummy variables for
consumption in excess of allocation, property
value, household size, number of rooms,
climate.

OLS

Short-run
0.28; inter
0.12;
summer
0.36
Long-run
0.77; winter
0.29;
summer
0.86

Short-run
0.14;
winter
0.16;
summer
0.15
Long-run
0.38;
winter
0.33;
summer
0.49

Free water allowance results in
wastage and that its removal
would be an efficient way of
reducing water consumption.
Little equity impact through
removal of allowance

Renwick,
Green and
McCorkle
(1998)

Panel.

California,
1989-1996.

Increasing
block and
flat rates.

Average
monthly
household water
use

Alternative non-price demand management
policies, marginal price, difference term,
income, lot size, precipitation (difference
from mean), persons per household;

2SLS

0.16-0.20

n.a.

Failure to account for the
influence of non-price demand
side management policies may
result in an overestimate of the
price responsiveness of water
demand.

Renwick and
Archibald
(1998)

Panel.

California,
1986-1990.

Increasing
block rate.

Total water
consumption

Marginal price of water, Nordin difference,
policy dummies for restriction, allocation and
rebates on water saving technology, adoption
of water saving technologies, gross monthly
household income, number of household
members, housing density, number of
faucets, inflation, cumulative monthly
rainfall.

2SLSand
OLS

Overall
0.33; low
income
0.53;
middle
income
0.21; high
income 0.11

0.36

Higher water prices are
expected to directly reduce
demand in the short run and
stimulate the demand for water
efficient
technologies
by
increasing the relative benefits
associated with adoption in the
medium to long run.

Pint (1999)

Panel.

Alameda,
Spain,
1982-1992.

Increasing
block and
flat rates.

Household
water use as a
deviation from
average use

House size, lot size, precipitation, lagged
precipitation, temperature and lagged
temperature, marginal price and price
squared.

OLS and
ML

Summer
0.20-0.47;
winter 0.331.24

n.a.

Maximum likelihood models
that explicitly consider the
household’s response to the
rate
structure
result
in
plausible estimates of water
demand.

Hoglund
(1999)

Panel.

Sweden,
1980-1992.

Flat rates
and
decreasing
block rates.

Average
household
consumption
per person per
day.

Marginal price of water, fixed price for
typical household, average price, gross
household income, average household size,
regional dummy variables.

OLS, GLS
and 2SLS

Marginal
0.08-0.12;
average
0.20-0.26;
fixed 0.010.02.

0.07-0.13

Strong regional variation in
household
consumption,
significant scale economies in
household water consumption.
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Rietveld,
Rouwendal
and Zwart
(2000)

Cross
sectional.

Salatiga,
Indonesia
1994.

Increasing
block rate.

Monthly water
consumption.

Marginal price of water, “virtual income” to
account for lower infra-marginal price paid
for the first allocation of water, household
size, and availability of non-piped water.

OLS

1.28-1.16

n.a.

Demand depends on household
size
and
presence
of
alternative supply.

Gaudin,
Griffin and
Sickles
(2001)

Panel.

Texas,
1981-1985.

Increasing
block rate.

Water
consumption
per capita per
month

Average price, per capita income, proportion
of population of Spanish origin, climate,
average annual precipitation

OLS and
GLS

Overall
0.19-0.47
Summer
0.12–0.15;
winter
0.24 to 0.27

0.11-0.19

Results
suggest
that
approximately ¾ of total water
usage is not responsive to price
changes

Higgs and
Worthington
(2001)

Panel.

Brisbane,
Queensland,
1996.

Fixed
charge
unlimited
allowance
with
simulation
of two-part
tariff with
zero fixed
allowance
and flat rate.

Household
quarterly water
consumption.

Household income, value of property,
marginal price under the user-pays system,
seasonal dummy, number of household
members, other house characteristics, and
soil characteristic.

IV and Logit

n.a.

n.a.

Because
of
uncertainty
associated
with
future
household water demand, the
option to remain on the nonuser pays system has value and
is incorporated into the
appropriate decision-making
model.

MartinezEspineira
(2002)

Panel.

Spain,
1993-1999.

Two-part
tariff with
fixed
allowance
and
increasing
block and
flat rates.

Average
monthly
consumption.

Average temperature, population density,
household size, fixed component of water
and sewerage bill, billing period, income
index, marginal price, population over 64
years and under 19 year, precipitation,
percentage of housing as main residence
dwelling, tourism index, Nordin-difference.

IV

0.12-0.17

n.a.

Significant
difference
in
summer-only elasticities and
major impact of climatic
variables
on
monthly
consumption.

Timmins
(2002)

Panel.

13 cities, San
Joaquin
Valley,
California,
1970-1993.

Increasing,
decreasing
block and
flat rates.

Quantity
demanded

Typical rate structure consists of three
components: (i) a service charge (ii) some
quantity of water and (iii) marginal rate
charge for each additional acre foot of water
consumed, annual rainfall, number of active
residential service connections; dummy for
cities.

OLS

n.a.

n.a.

Municipal
water
administrators charge below
marginal cost and in so doing
inefficiently exploit aquifer
stocks and induce social
surplus losses.
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Hadjispirou,
Koundouri
and Pashardes
(2002)

Crosssectional.

Cyprus,
1996/97.

Increasing
block rate.

Annual water
consumption

Marginal price (highest tariff block in cubic
meter), income, number of adults, children
washing machine, dish washer, square meters
of dwelling, toilets outside and inside,
running water, household head employed in
agriculture, household head retired, sewage
system,

ML

n.a.

n.a.

Large families are at a
disadvantage under increasing
block rates because they face a
higher marginal price of water
than small families at the same
level of utility.

MartinezEspineira
(2003a)

Panel.

Spain,
1995-1999.

Increasing
block rate.

Proportion of
consumers in
each block;
average
monthly per
account water
use.

Income index per capita, percentage of
population under the age of 19 years,
percentage of population over 64 years, the
average temperature in each month, mean
marginal
price
difference,
average
temperature.

IV, Logit,
OLS and
GLS

0.37-0.67

n.a.

Nordin’s specification using
aggregate data acompared to
average marginal price and
average
difference.
Price
elasticity not significantly
different.

Garcia and
Reynaud
(2003)

Panel.

Bordeaux,
France,
1995-1998.

Flat rate.

Annual water
consumption
per water utility

Marginal price, average taxable income per
household, number of dependents per
household, proportion of housing equipped
with a bath or toilet, proportion of industrial
users, summer rainfall, proportion of houses
built after 1982.

GMM

0.25

0.03

Consistent
and
efficient
econometric method is used to
estimate
supply-demand
system with simultaneous
equations.

MartinezEspinera
(2003b)

Timeseries.

Seville, Spain
1991-1999.

Increasing
block rate.

Average
household
monthly water
consumption

Marginal price of water (adjusted for multipart tariff structure), virtual income (the
difference average salaries and the Nordindifference), rainfall, average maximum daily
temperature, number of daily hours of
restrictions, outdoor use bans, information
campaigns, summer

Granger
causality,
cointegration
analysis.

Short-run
0.08-0.11;
long-run
0.40-0.51.

n.a.

Engle-Granger and WickensBreusch ECMs provide similar
results.

Nauges and
Thomas
(2003)

Panel

France,
1988-1993.

Flat rate.

Average annual
water
consumption

Lagged demand, price (at the beginning of
contract with annual updating rule) and
income.

GMM

Short-run
0.26; longrun 0.40

0.51

Local authorities should refer
to long run elasticities when
assessing the impact of tariff
changes on consumer welfare.

MartinezEspinera and
Nauges
(2004)

Timeseries

Seville, Spain
1991-1999.

Increasing
block rate.

Average
monthly water
consumption

Marginal price of water (adjusted for multipart tariff structure), virtual income (the
difference average salaries and the Nordindifference), rainfall, population, number of
daily hours of restrictions, outdoor use bans.

OLS and
GLS

0.07–0.13

0.07-0.13

Once
price
insensitive
threshold
is
reached,
information campaigns or
promotion of low-water using
equipment is more effective in
reducing consumption than an
increase in price.
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Hoffman,
Worthington
and Higgs
(2006)

Panel

Brisbane,
Queensland,
1998-2003.

Two-part
tariff with
zero
allowance
and flat rate.

Quarterly
annual water
consumption

Marginal price of water, household income
and size, number of rainy and warm days in
quarter, summer dummy.

OLS

Short-run
0.51; longrun 1.16

0.23

Price and income elasticity
higher in owner-occupied
households
than
renter
households. Summer and rainy
days exert strong influence on
residential water consumption.

Gaudin
(2006)

Crosssection

United States,
1995.

Uniform,
decreasing
and
increasing
block rates.

Per capita
residential
consumption

Average price of water, per capita income,
average number of household members,
population
density,
average
annual
precipitation, number of high temperature
days.

OLS, 2SLS

0.37

0.30

Price information on water
bills has a significant positive
influence on elasticity.

Notes: OLS – Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS – Two-stage Least Squares, 3SLS – Three-stage Least Squares, IV – Instrumental Variables, SE – Systems Equations, ML – Maximum Likelihood, GLS –
Generalised Least Sqaures, GMM – Generalised Method of Moments, ECM – Error Correction Model, n.a – not applicable or not calculated.

